

is that the relations we conceptually represent are the relations which the in-itself exemplifies.

77. With respect to the manifold of outer sense, Kant does not seem to have found the happy medium between the absurdity of saying that Space is a form of outer sense in that the manifold of outer sense is literally spatial, and the overly strong claim that the only way in which spatial relations enter into perceptual states is as contents of *conceptual* representations. This means that the characteristics of the representations of receptivity as such, which is what should *properly* be meant by the forms of sensibility, are never adequately discussed, and the so-called forms of sensibility become ever more clearly, as the argument of the *Critique* proceeds, forms of conceptual representations. By overlooking the importance of analogical concepts—save in theological contexts—and hence by failing to note the analogical character of our concepts of the attributes and relations which sense impressions *must* have to perform their explanatory role, Kant reduces the concepts of receptivity and sensibility to empty abstractions.

78. If, *per impossibile*, Kant had developed the idea of the manifold of sense as characterized by analogical counterparts of the perceptible qualities and relations of physical things and events he could have given an explicit account of the ability of the impressions of receptivity to guide minds, endowed with the conceptual framework he takes us to have, to form the conceptual representations we do of individual physical objects and events in Space and Time. He could thus have argued that when on a certain occasion we come to have an intuitive conceptual representation that this green square adjoins that red square, we do so by virtue of having a complex of non-conceptual representations which, although non-spatial and without colour, have characteristics which are the counterparts of *square, red, green* and *adjoining*, and which make them such as to account for the fact that we have *this* conceptual representation rather than that of there being a purple pentagon above an orange ellipse. That he 'implicitly' gives some such account (or must have done so) has been argued by many, thus, by Professor Paton,¹ though the full scope of the distinctions necessary to pull it off has not always been appreciated.

¹ Kant's *Metaphysics of Experience*, Volume I, Chapter 6, Section 8.

II

APPEARANCES AND THINGS IN THEMSELVES:

1. MATERIAL THINGS

1. At the heart of the Kantian distinction between things-in-themselves and appearances is the contrast, drawn by Descartes, but by no means original with him, between formal and (in the medieval sense) objective reality. This distinction, in some form, is essential to the idea of a conceptual representation, though a related distinction, easily confused with it, holds of the non-conceptual representations of sense. I shall assume that the distinction is a familiar one, and say just enough about it to show how it, and related distinctions, illuminate Kant's contrast of things-in-themselves with appearances, and explain why, in spite of the retro-causation attempted by many of his admirers, he never even considered abandoning it. Since both the Cartesian distinctions and the use to which they were put by Kant can be translated into contemporary terms, and since the problems with which Kant was dealing reappear in modern dress, this chapter, like the first, will be a blend of historical and systematic themes.

2. I shall continue for the time being, at least, to assume the general validity of the distinction between mental acts or actualities and their overt expression in linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour. I shall also work, provisionally, with a Cartesian dualism of body and mind—noting, however, that if it were not for his ill-advised claim that we 'clearly conceive mind, that is, a substance which thinks, without body, that is to say, without an extended substance . . .',¹ almost everything Descartes wanted to

¹ *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, translated by E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, Volume II, p. 59.

say could have been put in Aristotelian terms, a mind being a person *qua* subject of mental acts, capacities and propensities, its body a person *qua* subject of bodily states, capacities and propensities. Whether sensory states are sufficiently akin to conceptual thinking proper to be classified as mental, or sufficiently different from both the mental and the bodily to merit a pigeon-hole of their own, is one which any contemporary Aristotelian must face. The dichotomy of predicates of persons into M-predicates and P-predicates¹ is useful for many purposes, but for others is coarse-grained and procrustean. However this may be, Descartes, as is well known, found it appropriate to classify the representations of sense with the representations of conceptual thinking proper as *cogitationes*. The fact that both can be characterized as representations (and have other common features which were explored in the preceding chapter) tempted him to apply to the humbler species the epistemological and ontological categories he applied to conceptual thinking proper, not simply in the spirit of analogy, the positive being counterbalanced by the negative, but literally, the negative analogy being construed as specific difference.

3. The importance of the categories Descartes applies to mental acts lies, as I have indicated, in the fact that they can be seen to be less sophisticated counterparts of distinctions which are drawn with more or less rigour in those contemporary philosophies of mind which have been influenced by formal semantics. The distinctions fall into two closely related, indeed complementary, sets, one focused on concepts pertaining to truth, the other on concepts pertaining to existence—none of which is surprising, since it would generally be admitted that there is the closest of connections between existence and truth, at least in the case of things and their modifications. The first set of categories distinguishes between:

- (a) a representation *qua* act, i.e. *qua* representing or 'operation of the mind';
- (b) the character by virtue of which it represents what it represents; and,
- (c) where appropriate, the substance or modification of which the representing, *qua* representing what it represents, is true.

¹ P. F. Strawson, *Individuals*, London, 1959, p. 104.

Closely related to the above is a contrast between two ways in which things or substances and their modifications can exist:

- (a) They can exist 'in' mental acts of representing—i.e. they can be, in Descartes' phrase, 'the objective reality of an idea' by which, he tells us, he understands 'the entity or being of the thing represented by the idea, in so far as the entity is in the idea'.¹
- (b) They can, as I shall put it, exist *simpliciter*. In Descartes' terminology, 'the same things are said to be formally in the object of the ideas when they are in them such as they are conceived'.²

4. By contrasting existence *simpliciter* with existence 'in' representings (that is, in 'ideas' as Descartes uses the term in the passage quoted above), I do not mean to imply that the concept of 'existence *simpliciter*' has nothing to do with existence 'in' representings. Indeed, I have already suggested that the concept of existence *simpliciter* is internally related to the concept of truth. But the development of this theme requires the more elaborate framework of the next chapter.

5. The first set of distinctions is related to the second as follows:

- (1) For a thing or modification to exist 'in' a mental act is for the latter to represent it.
- (2) A mental act representing a modification is true of a substance which exists *simpliciter* if and only if the modification exists *simpliciter* as a modification of the substance.

I have deliberately put *these* two points in a make-shift way, since more subtle formulations require distinctions—e.g. between objects and states of affairs—which were not part of Descartes' technical apparatus, though, of course, they made their presence felt.

6. We can tie these distinctions in with the 'new way of ideas' by identifying ideas with entities which are capable of existing 'in' representings, as thus capable. If we do so, however, we must take account of the fact that the term is often used (as in the passage quoted above) to stand for representings, as contrasted with

¹ Haldane and Ross, Volume II, p. 52.

² *Ibid.*, p. 53.

what they represent. If we drop this usage to avoid confusion we can say that 'ideas' in the sense of representables *qua* representables are capable of two interesting relations, the 'in' relation to mental acts, and the 'truth' relation to things and their modifications *qua* existing *simpliciter*.

7. In each of these relations ideas have a one-many aspect which was a constant source of puzzlement:

- (a) with respect to the 'in' relation, somehow one and the same idea could be 'in' many acts;
- (b) with respect to the 'truth' relation, one and the same *general* idea could be 'true of' many things.

The former sameness was connected in various ways—most interestingly by Malebranche—with the notion that the primary mode of being of ideas was in God's intellect. What we should now call the public character of concepts was given a theological twist. The second sameness raised the age-old question: How can generals be 'true of' things if, as philosophers have often been tempted to say, there are no generals 'in' things? I shall be concerned in subsequent chapters with both the public character of concepts and the existence of generals.

8. Two final remarks on these Cartesian categories before we apply them to Kant. We distinguished above between a representing *qua* act and a representing *qua* representing something. Since the latter tended to be construed on the model of container to thing contained, the question naturally arises as to what character a 'containing' act might have in addition to its relational property of 'containing' an idea. The dominant Cartesian view seems to have been that *intrinsically* all basic mental acts are alike—all instances, so to speak, of mental-act-ness. (One is reminded of Moore's diaphanous acts.) It should be noted, however, that in a careful passage, in which he is concerned to reply to sophisticated objections, he defines the term 'idea' in such a way that it refers not to a representing as such, nor to what is 'in' the representing, but rather to the 'form' of the representing, i.e. the character by having which it represents what it represents. Thus he writes, 'By the word "idea" I understand that form of any thought, by the immediate perception of which I am conscious of that same

thought.'¹ Thus used, the term 'idea' is a descendant of the scholastic term 'species' as applied to mental acts. This use is a recessive trait, even in Descartes. After all, the above definition occurs in a reply to objections made from a more traditional point of view. The use of the term 'idea' to stand not for the 'form' of a representing but for what is represented *qua* represented is more akin to the scholastic term 'concept'. In any case, Cartesians could easily put their standard view into scholastic clothing by defining 'idea' in the sense of the form or species of a mental act in terms of what the act 'contains', i.e. in terms of the 'idea', in the more usual sense, which is 'in' them.

9. On the other hand, whether representings are 'informed' by ideas or 'contain' them, representings do have other features—temporal, at least, and, it would seem, such relations as make complex acts out of simpler ones. Here one runs up against the problem, discussed in Chapter I in connection with the representations of sense, of whether a complex representing is complex *qua* act or *qua* representing a complex, where 'representing a complex' is construed as a matter of 'containing' a complex idea. This problem, particularly as it arises with respect to conceptual representations, reappears in ever new guises, and will be discussed in Chapter IV.

10. A second remark is, perhaps, in order. Modern philosophers are often tempted to construe Descartes as, so to speak, a 'thought-is-inner-speech' philosopher *manqué*—to interpret him, that is, in a way which construes the *inesse* of ideas in mental acts as though it were a matter of the acts being tokens (utterances in ones heart) of Mentalese words and sentences. It is clear, however, that the feeling for the logical forms of thought, so clear in the disciples of Ockham, and which revives in Leibnitz and, above all, Kant, is almost totally lacking in Descartes and his British successors. A clear interpretation of intellectual *cogitationes* as 'inner speech' would have made more difficult, if not impossible, many of the exasperating confusions which are characteristic of pre-Kantian philosophy, and by no means totally lacking in Kant.

11. Thus it is exactly the 'containing' model which permitted

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 52.

the Cartesian blurring of the distinction between sensible and conceptual representations which, as I argued in the preceding chapter, Kant struggles to establish on a sound basis—with only partial success.

II

12. The root notion of 'existing in itself' is that of existing *simpliciter* as contrasted with existing *as represented*, i.e. existing 'in' a representing or as 'idea'.¹ Clearly *representings* (conceptual or non-conceptual) as well as *non-representings* may be *represented*. Thus we can distinguish:

- (1a) non-representings *qua* existing *simpliciter*;
- (1b) representings *qua* existing *simpliciter*;
- (2a) represented non-representings *qua* represented;
- (2b) represented representings *qua* represented.²

13. Let us now introduce the term 'in itself' for anything, representing or not, which exists *simpliciter*, *as existing simpliciter*; and let us use the term 'content' for anything, representing or not, which exists 'in' a representing, *qua* so doing. Finally, let us call intuitive representings in themselves³ (as contrasted with *represented* intuitive representings) 'constituting acts'. Notice that it would seem to be possible for an intuitive representing to be intuitively *represented*, i.e. for there to be an 'inner intuition' of an intuition. Indeed, as we shall see, it is necessary for there to be such—but these questions must await a general discussion of inner sense and apperception.

14. We must now take provisional account of the fact that, according to Kant's official position, representings-in-themselves are not in Time. According to this position, Time is, in the *first* instance, the form of intuitively represented representings; and, in the *second* instance, the form of other *represented*s, both repre-

¹ In view of the notorious *ing-ed* ambiguity of words like 'representation' and its German equivalent, '*Vorstellung*', it will be useful, indeed essential, to use the explicit 'ing' or 'ed' form whenever there is a danger of confusion—and to use the technical term 'content' in place of the ambiguous 'idea'.

² Notice that there is a further sense in which a representation can exist in 'in' a representing—the 'internal accusative' sense in which a waltz exists in a waltzing. I shall not use this internal accusative sense without making the fact explicit.

³ Intuitive representings, it will be remembered, are a special class of representings of individuals.

sented representings and represented non-representings (e.g. figures in Space). This thesis was intended by Kant to be the exact counterpart of his treatment of Space as the form of intuitively represented non-representings. And, indeed, the parallel is there, blurred by the ambiguities explored in the preceding chapter, compounded. I argued there that by implicitly requiring that a relation be spatial in a sense which would satisfy a physicist, or else be *in no sense spatial*, Kant dooms to failure his attempt to distinguish the form of outer sense from the Space of mechanics. We shall see that yet other senses in which relations can legitimately be said to be 'spatial' are required by a metaphysics which frees Kant's argument from its historically inevitable limitations.

15. In the case of Time, as Kant himself notes in the second edition, his views encountered greater resistance. He makes the parallel assumption that a temporal relation must be 'chronometric' in a sense congenial to the physicist, or else be *in no sense temporal*. We soon find, however, even more clearly than in the case of Space, that his argument requires two additional uses of temporal expressions. The first of these is required in connection with the form of inner sense, which is confused with the form of inner intuition exactly as the form of outer sense was confused with Space as an intuitively represented framework for the representation of spatial configurations.¹

16. We soon find, moreover, a *third* kind of temporality peeking out at us from almost every page of the *Critique* from the *Analytic* on. For the *successiveness*, whether it be called temporal or no, of the epistemic acts of the real self in its struggles with the impressions of receptivity, and the *successiveness* of these impressions themselves (and, presumably, of the realities which impinge on our receptivity to cause them), are no mere *façons de parler*, but essential to the very meaning of the argument. Kant's failure to do explicit justice to this successiveness is no accident, and I shall shortly be examining the reasons which account for it. For the moment I simply note that if we were to adopt Kant's official restriction of the vocabulary of Time to the ideal temporal continuum of physical theory we could do no better than follow Bergson's example—though not in all respects—and contrast Time with *durée* and say that the

¹ For an elaboration of this point see the Appendix.

successiveness of representings-in-themselves is *durée* rather than Time.

17. Bergson, indeed, found his cue in Kant, for in B149 Kant writes:

... if we suppose an object of non-sensible intuition to be given,¹ we can indeed represent it through all the predicates which are implied in the presupposition that it has none of the characteristics proper to sensible intuition: that it is not extended or in Space, *that its duration is not a time* . . . (Italics mine)

Again in B798, after insisting that 'we cannot . . . *ursprünglich aussinnen* [which Kemp Smith translates as 'creatively imagine'] any object in terms of any new quality which does not allow of being given an experience', he grants that the concepts of 'a presence that is not spatial, a duration that is not temporal' are not self-contradictory—though, of course, he goes on to say that as far as *our* reason is concerned, they would 'be without an object', since we cannot intuitively represent them.

18. It is possible (as Bergson saw) to insist on the transcendental ideality of *scientific* Time, while affirming the transcendental reality of states of affairs which are temporal in a related, but by no means identical, sense. Indeed, this move is essential to the coherence of a Kantian philosophy, a point I have already argued in the parallel case of Space. The force of Kant's contention that the concepts of such spatiality and such temporality must be without an object because they cannot be illustrated in intuition is a topic for subsequent investigation.

III

19. Now, if the core of the notion of the in-itself is the concept of that which exists *simpliciter* as contrasted with that which exists as idea (content) or representable, it is clear that Kant adds to this core a theme of 'unknowability'. This unknowability, however, must be compatible with the *philosophical* (transcendental) knowledge that there is an in-itself, and that it is structured in a way which can be *abstractly* represented—in some sense of 'abstractly'—and which accounts for the existence and character of experience.

¹ Thus the intellectual intuition which God has of the world.

20. Correspondingly, the core of the Kantian notion of an appearance is that of an idea or content. Thus, when Kant tells us that spatial objects are appearances his claim is a remote cousin of Berkeley's claim that 'extension and figure . . . are in the mind *only as they are perceived by it*, that is, not by way of *mode* or *attribute*, but only by way of *idea* . . .'.¹ It should be borne in mind, however, that Kant himself strongly disapproved² of this use of the term 'idea' and gives the latter a more sophisticated use. His term 'representation' (*Vorstellung*) is a rough equivalent, though only when used in the sense of represented or representable as such.

21. In the preceding chapter I pointed out that Kant's argument requires a distinction between conceptual representings (of which intuition is a special case) and non-conceptual representings. This calls for a corresponding distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual contents.³ To the extent to which Kant is confused about the distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual representings, to that extent we can expect to find confusion in his treatment of 'appearance'. It will be helpful, however, to introduce the topic of physical appearance in terms of the *conceptual* representation of individuals, where the representations are intuitions in the sense:

- (a) that they are representations of *this-suches*, i.e. representings in the expression of which predicates do not occur in the properly predicative position;
- (b) the *suches* are sensible characteristics.

Kant seems to limit these sensible characteristics to spatial characteristics as contrasted, in the *first* instance, with colour (partly because what we intuitively represent, we in some sense 'construct' or 'draw'); and, in the *second* instance, as contrasted with temporal characteristics (another consequence of his confusion between outer sense and outer intuition). Thus he can be construed as holding that nothing is *intuited* as both spatial and

¹ *Principles of Human Knowledge*, edited by A. D. Lindsay, London, 1934, p. 136 (§ XLIX).

² Thus in A319–20; B376–7.

³ It will be remembered that the 'of'-phrases which 'refer' to the 'content' of a representing are to be construed as adjectives which combine with the category word 'impression' or 'conception' (*conceiving*) to classify these representations as of a certain kind.

temporal; which is quite compatible with holding, as he does, that in another mode of conceptual representation items *are* represented as both spatial and temporal.

22. As in the case of the 'in-itself' we must supplement the core notion of a physical appearance as idea (or content), to give it a properly Kantian flavour. Thus we must add that an appearance is an individual which, though it exists primarily as represented and secondarily as representable, cannot exist *simpliciter* (i.e. in itself). Thus, an individual which is an appearance cannot be identical with anything which exists *simpliciter*. On the other hand, it is essential to note that Kant is *not* claiming that *no* item which exists (or is capable of existing) 'in' a representing can exist *simpliciter* (i.e. in itself). Everything hinges on *how* the item is represented.

23. Thus, an item which is given a purely *transcendental* identification, that is, an identification of the form

the item to which my receptivity responded with an impression which was taken up into this perceiving

can properly be said to exist in itself. But, as Kant sees it, such a purely transcendental description is very thin beer.

24. I have implied that Kant unduly restricts the class of predicates which permit the items of which they are true to exist *simpliciter*, as well as 'in' representings, by overlooking, or at least minimizing, the possibility that spatial, temporal and even colour predicates might be systematically ambiguous. On the other hand, as I have pointed out, he frequently uses language (e.g. in the 'Subjective Deduction') which implies that items-in-themselves can be described in richer terms than the purely transcendental description illustrated above, and exist in themselves as thus described. Acts of 'synthesis' are items-in-themselves, and yet *somehow* they can truly be described as 'successive'. Be that as it may, his official move is to deny that such descriptions can be in spatio-temporal terms.

25. Less puzzling is his treatment of monism and pluralism with respect to the in-itself. What he rejects is not the claim that we have philosophical knowledge that there is a plurality of items-in-themselves but rather monism or pluralism as theses with respect

to the number of *ultimate* logical subjects. It will be remembered that according to the philosophical tradition the 'accidents' or 'modifications' of 'substances' are, to use a contemporary phrase, 'dependent particulars', which themselves can have accidents or modifications. One of Kant's points in the *Paralogisms* is that the 'I' might be a dependent particular, an aspect of a more fundamental reality, rather than an ultimate logical subject.¹

26. Thus, although Kant denies that physical appearances, which, in their primary mode of being, are intuitively represented spatial *this-suches*, can exist in themselves, he does seem to think [(B164), (A545; B573)] that the plurality of physical appearances can be said with good reason to correspond to a plurality of *items* (not necessarily *ultimate* logical subjects) in a way which can be expressed by the peculiar relational phrase 'is an appearance of'.

27. Let me complete this initial account by noting that Kant thinks it to be a necessary truth that if there are appearances there are things in themselves. In one sense, although a limited one, he is obviously right, and the point is more interesting than is the superficial one that 'appearance' implies 'something appears', though Kant does sum up his view in this manner. The point is rather that it is an analytic truth that if there are *represented*s there must be *representings*.

28. But might not *representings* be merely represented *representings*? The answer is that whether an item be a non-representing or a representing of a non-representing, or a representing of a representing of a non-representing, etc., if it exists merely *as represented*, it must be the content of a representing which, whether or not it is *represented*, also exists *simpliciter* or in itself.²

29. It must be granted that this argument establishes at most that if there are *represented*s there must be *representings* which exists *simpliciter* or *an sich*. It does not establish that there are non-representings *an sich*, and Leibnitz, for one, and also Berkeley can be construed as holding that everything which exists in itself is, if

¹ See, for example, the note to A364.

² In contemporary terms the point is that the concept of the right-hand side of a semantical statement is the correlate of the concept of its left-hand side.

not a representing, at least a representer. Nor does the argument establish that what exists *simpliciter* is in any sense unknowable, nor that represented individuals can only be 'appearances of', rather than identical with, items which exist in themselves. But Kant, of course, thinks he can establish these additional points.

30. One element in his strategy hinges on the fact that the epistemological tools he brings to his task include not only his version of the Cartesian distinction between formal and objective reality but the idea that the human (or any finite) mind is passive with respect to the impressions which initiate its conceptual representation of a world of which it is a part.

31. The following passage from the first edition *Paralogisms* provides a useful summary of the points I have so far made in this chapter:

Nothing whatever is in Space save in so far as it is actually represented in it. It is a proposition which must indeed sound strange that a thing can exist only in the representation of it, but in this case the objection falls in as much as the things with which we are concerned are not things in themselves, but appearances only, that is, representations (A375).

Although this passage was dropped in the second edition, the significance of this fact must not be overestimated. For Kant came to see that although physical appearances may exist *primarily* as the content of *actual* intuitive representing, they exist *secondarily* as the content of *obtainable* intuitive representings, and, still more remotely, as the abstractly represented system (Nature in its physical aspect) of which *this* and *that* intuitively represented are constituent parts. In this context the more 'primary' is that which is closer to the *actual* as contrasted with the *potential* or *hypothetical*. In another dimension, of course, Nature is primary and our glimpses of it secondary.

IV

32. It has often been noted that when Kant is smoothing the path for his non-critical readers he tends to say *not* that we know *appearances* but that we know things (in themselves) *as they appear*

to us.¹ On the whole, however, his considered formulation is that we know appearances. What is the significance of this change? One explanation, sound as far as it goes, is based on the fact that although Kant is convinced that the implications of practical or ethical discourse entitle us to say that persons are ultimate logical subjects rather than mere features of a mere basic 'substratum', he does not think that reflection on our knowledge of *matter of fact*—even introspective—entitles us to say that what exists in itself is an ultimate plurality of logical subjects.

33. Thus, while Kant undoubtedly thinks that there are features of the in-itself which are, in some sense, the counterparts of the plurality of physical appearances, he finds this notion empty in that, as he sees it, we can have no determinate conception of this plurality. All determinate conception, as far as human minds are concerned, involves spatio-temporal schematization, and, as we have seen, he regards the concepts of Space and Time as unambiguous in a way which entails that if Space and Time are transcendently ideal, *anything* we determinately conceive of in spatial or temporal terms must be transcendently ideal. This line of thought turns Kant's attention away from the correspondence of the plurality of intuited and intuitable spatial objects with an abstractly conceived plurality of items-in-themselves (which, as we have seen, might be modifications of one single thing-in-itself rather than a plurality of things-in-themselves), to the global relation of spatio-temporal Nature to 'the in-itself' which impinges on our sensibility.

34. Yet there is a more important, though not unrelated, consideration which has a direct bearing on the possible relevance today of Kant's contention that the world of physical objects in Space and Time is appearance. Thus, when, at the common-sense level, we distinguish between a thing and how it appears to us, we identify the thing in terms of characteristics it can actually have, and though in any particular case it may only *appear* to have them, it does so by virtue of having competing characteristics which belong to the same families. According to Kant, however, that which exists *simpliciter* can have *none* of the characteristics in terms

¹ Both locutions, however, are found throughout the *Critique* (see, e.g., A258; B314), and take on richer meanings as the argument progresses.

of which we represent the objects of perception. As we saw in the preceding chapter, our basic representations with respect to the physical world are of the form

this-cube

and such *representeds* are incapable of existing *simpliciter*, even as partial aspects of the total 'in-itself'. To say that an object appears to be ϕ implies that the object *as identified* exists *simpliciter*, and, for Kant, nothing identified in spatio-temporal terms can exist as such in itself. As was pointed out above, only that which is identified in purely transcendental terms can exist as such in itself, and transcendental identification, of this kind, though genuine, is, for Kant, completely indeterminate and provides no concrete way of comparing and contrasting one item with any other.

V

35. Another theme in Kant's conception of appearance was not brought fully under control until the second edition *Refutation of Idealism*. A failure to draw clearly and firmly the distinctions we have been elaborating led him to think that the sensible representations of the empirical self have a privileged status which makes them, so to speak, the cash of the world of appearance, even though to be so, they must be represented (and they are, indeed, appearances or *representeds*) as belonging to a system (Nature) of which they are a vanishingly small part.

36. This idea is akin to that of certain contemporary philosophers, not too far removed from positivistic phenomenalism, who construe the conceptual framework of physical objects as one which, though not *reducible* to the framework of sense impressions, is nevertheless *subordinated* to the latter, and has its cash value in its (probabilistic) power to mediate between sense impression premises and sense impression conclusions. (Compare the instrumentalist conception of microphysical theories as symbolic devices the meaning of which is *constituted* by their power to mediate between premises concerning observables and conclusions concerning observables.)

37. 'After all,' we can imagine Kant to say, 'it is the representa-

tions of outer sense which set the understanding in motion, and although the conceptualized world includes both empirical self and material things, are not the represented sensory states of the empirical self more strictly the phenomenal counterparts of the manifold of outer sense than are the intuitively represented states of material things?' Yet the fact that the impressions of outer receptivity appear in experience as sensory states of the empirical self is quite compatible with the idea that they impel an understanding with our conceptual apparatus to represent *two parallel strands of appearance*: our empirical self *and* material things. For, after all, viewed transcendently, the representations of outer sense are functions of both the self-in-itself as patient and the non-ego as agent. It must not be overlooked that the states of the empirical self are as much appearances, that is, *contents* of conceptual representings, as are the states of material things in Space.

38. Part of the explanation for Kant's lingering tendency to minimize these considerations is to be found in the idea that states of the empirical self have *content* in a way in which material things do not. The old confusions involved in the distinction between primary and secondary qualities continued to plague Kant. As we have noted, he so construes the figurative synthesis of spatial items by the productive imagination that it excludes colour. It does indeed synthesize degrees of that in appearances which, in the language of the *Anticipations of Perception*, 'corresponds' to 'sensation',¹ that is, the 'real' in appearances (B207) or their 'matter' (A20; B34). But this 'real' or 'matter' is not colour but rather force as a concept of mechanics. At this stage of the scientific revolution it had come to seem a phenomenological truth that the place of colour is (somehow) in the mind. Kant, to use Whitehead's phrase, bifurcated Nature and drew the proper conclusion that since the physical, thus represented, '... contains nothing but mere relation' (B66-7), it cannot exist in itself.

39. Kant, of course, would scarcely have held that states of the empirical self are literally coloured, any more than that they are literally extended. Yet he could have held that visual 'sensations'

¹ A166. See A20; B34 where he speaks of 'that in the appearance which corresponds to sensation', and calls it the 'matter' of appearance (which corresponds to the phrase 'the real in appearance' of the *Anticipations*).

of the empirical self 'contain' colour in the sense of representing it, and, therefore, that they have content in a sense in which purely physical appearance does not.¹

40. Kant's discussion of these matters is tangled and confused, and it can be argued that his position is the less drastic one that the productive imagination synthesizes objects which are coloured as well as extended, though there is a difference, bound up with the apparent irrelevance of colour to the mechanical behaviour of material things, between the objectivity of colour and the objectivity of extension.

VI

41. In the first edition, then, Kant was tempted to construe spatial complexes in the fully constituted world of appearance as existing 'in' representings which belong to the history of the temporal self. Since the temporal self is itself appearance, this would amount to the idea that, whatever may go on behind the scenes, we represent spatial complexes in experience *by representing ourselves as representing spatial complexes*. This unfortunate tendency is corrected in the second edition. He there sees clearly that, in spite of their common foundation in the impressions of outer sense, the visual sensations of the empirical self, on the one hand, and the physical events, on the other, are on a par as appearances. They are alike *represented*, if I may so put it, of the first degree.²

¹ How he could have held that the visual sensations of the empirical self 'contain' colour without granting that in the same sense of 'contain' they contain extension is difficult to see. This highlights the difficulty of holding that 'sensations', whether real or phenomenal, granted that they are not extended in the literal way in which physical objects are extended, are 'purely intensive magnitudes'. Yet some of the paradox is removed when it is noted that Kant is prepared to say that the 'real' in appearances (which are obviously extended) 'has . . . magnitude but not extensive magnitude' (A168; B210).

² There remains the complication that to the extent to which Kant takes seriously the idea that physical objects are not coloured, colour, as far as the world of appearances is concerned, would be a *represented* of the second degree, i.e. we would represent colour only by representing ourselves as representing it. Colour would thus be, in a sense, an appearance to an appearance. This must not be confused with the idea that sensory states of the empirical self are 'appearances of appearances' (*Nachlass*), which finds expression in the 'double affection' theory. The latter is the idea that sensory states of the empirical self as part of Nature are brought about by physical stimulation of the sense organs (mediated by neuro-physiological states), but that this 'bringing about' and the factors it involves are themselves appearances represented by minds under the impact of things in themselves. (See below, § 57.)

42. The second edition *Refutation of Idealism* gives us the key to Kant's interpretation of experience as both knowledge of *appearances* and knowledge of *reality as it appears*. Given our conceptual equipment, we respond to the impressions of sense by conceptually representing a temporal me embedded in a spatio-temporal Nature. The determinate core of this representing consists of intuitive (but conceptual) representings of both *representings* (states of the empirical self) and *non-representings* (states of material things). I shall continue in the present chapter to concentrate on the latter.

43. A 'transcendental realist', as Kant uses this term, holds that, mis-perception aside, intuitively represented objects and events exist *simpliciter* as well as 'in' representings. If such a one were to hear Kant say that reality is such as to lead a being with our conceptual equipment to form the intuitive representings we do, he would say, 'Well, that is because the representings are, by and large, *true*. The things we conceptually represent also exist *simpliciter*, or in themselves, *as we represent them*.' In other words, if I may introduce contemporary terminology to make my point, the transcendental realist would say that the 'obtainability' of both the representings we *actually* have and the representings we *would* have *if* we were to undertake to change our perceptual orientation is grounded in the truth of these representings, the existence *simpliciter* of that which exists 'in' them as idea or content.

44. Notice that the contents of which we are speaking are *conceptual* contents. They are not the contents of non-conceptual representings (sense impressions proper). And they are contents pertaining to states of material things, as contrasted with contents pertaining to the empirical self. They are, in our terminology, represented *non-representings*, not represented *representings* (such as would be the contents of intuitive representings of our inner states).

45. The realist typically denies that concepts pertaining to physical objects are to be analysed in terms of sense contents, i.e. the contents of non-conceptual representings. He can, however, grant that concepts pertaining to physical objects can be analysed in terms of the contents of *outer intuitions*, in Kant's sense of the phrase, without thereby becoming a phenomenalist in the

Berkeleyian or positivistic sense. As for the *obtainability* of these contents, i.e. intuitively represented spatial structures, he would insist, as was pointed out above, that it rests on the existence *an sich* of the spatial structures in question, and the existence *simpliciter* of ourselves as sentient conceptualizing beings in Space and Time.

46. Now Kant himself, as has often been noted, does write on occasion as though physical objects were actual and obtainable sensory states of the empirical self, in other words, as though, in this respect at least, he were a Berkeleyian phenomenalist. This practice was corrected, if not entirely abandoned, in the second edition. Yet Kant remains *in another sense* a 'phenomenalist', though not in quite the sense which Kemp Smith valiantly attempts to define. Kant's phenomenism can be put, in first approximation, by saying that physical objects and events exist *only* 'in' certain actual and obtainable conceptual representings, the intuitive representings synthesized by the productive imagination in response to the impressions of sense. I say exist *only* 'in' such representings, for no *res extensa* exists *simpliciter* or in itself. A phenomenism which construes the physical world as a system of available contents in *this* sense differs radically from a phenomenism which construes the world as a system of available sense impressions, for it construes physical appearances as *irreducibly* physical. It differs from physical realism by denying that these appearances have more than 'objective' or 'representative' being.

47. The transcendental realist, as we have seen, interprets the obtainability of intuitions of spatial structures as grounded in the *an sich* existence of such structures. But while Kant agrees that this obtainability is grounded in the in-itself, he denies that this grounding requires that the in-itself be the spatio-temporal structure we conceptually represent. The strongest interpretation of this claim would be that existence in itself is in no sense akin to the spatio-temporal structures we represent. I see no reason to ascribe this view to Kant, nor does it seem to have any intrinsic merit. A less negative interpretation would be that it is not only *possible* for the in-itself to be, in an interesting sense, *analogous in structure* to the spatio-temporal world but that it is reasonable to think of it as having such a structure.

48. Something like this view can, indeed, be ascribed to Kant—with some reading between the lines—although his explicit use of the notion of analogical conception is in theological contexts. And even if we attribute to him the view that things-in-themselves are analogous in structure to the world of appearance, the analogy would, for him, be one which could only be 'cashed' by God—much as, according to traditional theology, only He can cash the analogies in terms of which we attempt to conceive Him. God would have a non-analogical grasp of things in themselves by virtue of the fact that His intuitive representations are not passive, but are the very volitions by which they are created.

49. The thesis I wish to defend, but not ascribe to Kant, though it is very much a 'phenomenism' in the Kantian (rather than Berkeleyian) sense, is that although the world we conceptually represent in experience exists only in actual and obtainable representings of it, we can say, from a transcendental point of view, not only that existence-in-itself accounts for this obtainability by virtue of having a certain analogy with the world we represent but also that in principle *we*, rather than God alone, can provide the cash. For, as I see it, the use of analogy in theoretical science, unlike that in theology, generates new determinate concepts. It does not merely indirectly specify certain unknown attributes by an 'analogy of proportion'. One might put this by saying that the conceptual structures of theoretical science give us new ways of schematizing categories.

50. Kant's own view is the more agnostic one that in our attempt to give an account of how our intuitive representings might be *Erkenntnisse* without being literally true, we are limited to making use of such abstract concepts as *existence-in-itself*, *existence 'in' representings*, *receptivity*, *form of intuition*, *judgment*, etc. One might formulate it as follows:

Reality is such that finite minds non-arbitrarily, in accordance with their forms of receptivity, and their conceptual frameworks, represent *this-suches* and make judgments about them. Only God, however, knows how reality is. [Compare the idealistic thesis that sound human judgments of the form S is P are to be philosophically re-parsed as Reality is such that (we must represent that) S is P and only the Absolute knows ('feels'?) how things really are.]

§ 1. Kant's account implies indeed that certain counterparts of our intuitive representations, namely God's intellectual intuitions, are literally true; but these literal truths can only be indirectly and abstractly represented by finite minds, and there is an impassible gulf between our *Erkenntnisse* and Divine Truth. If, however, as I shall propose in Chapter V, we replace the static concept of Divine Truth with a Peircean conception of truth as the 'ideal outcome of scientific inquiry', the gulf between appearances and things-in-themselves, though a genuine one, can in principle be bridged.

VII

§ 2. Our explication of Kant's phenomenalism is not yet complete. For, if the material world exists only in actual and obtainable representings by individual minds, the problem of its public character becomes acute. It is, in part, the problem of the *intersubjectivity* of the conceptual. Thus, when two minds represent that two plus two equals four, what exactly is the sense in which they are representing *the same*? Metaphorically, one says that two acts in different minds 'have the same content'. But even if Kant could offer a satisfactory account of the intersubjectivity of logical and mathematical concepts and of the representations of Space and Time, this, by itself, would clearly not enable him to distinguish the public character of *possible* states of *possible* material things from the public character of the *actual* course of events in *this* world.

§ 3. His answer clearly lies in a joint appeal to the intersubjectivity of the conceptual framework in terms of which we conceive *possible* states of affairs, and the public accessibility of the in-itself which, by affecting receptivity, generates the manifold of sense and guides the understanding in its use of this conceptual framework to form the intuitive representations of perceptual experience. The argument is a transcendental one to the effect that the very concept of 'objects of experience' as *non-arbitrary representations which can be shared* unfolds along these lines.¹ It is not always

¹ The connection of 'objectivity' with 'intersubjectivity' stands out most clearly in the *Prolegomena*. See particularly Part II, Sections 18 ff. The importance of these passages is obscured by the confusions involved in his distinction between 'judgments of perception' and 'judgments of experience'.

realized that the philosophical, or higher order, claim that experience requires synthetic necessary principles is, for Kant, an *analytic* truth arrived at by what we would call 'conceptual analysis', but which Kant calls '*Erklaerung*'. Thus, he writes, in the latter part of the *Critique*:

The German language has for the [Latin] terms exposition, explication, declaration, and definition, only one word, *Erklaerung*, and we need not, therefore, be so stringent in our requirements as altogether to refuse to philosophical explanations the honorable title definition (A730; B758).

Needless to say, however, the definitions in question are not stipulations of use for new sign designs but 'expositions of given concepts'.

§ 4. The above interpretation of the intersubjectivity or public character of appearances is not only compatible with but *requires* the idea that the primary mode of being of appearances is in conceptual representings by *individual minds*. There are, however, those, not uninfluenced by Hegel, who have argued that Kant was moving towards a position which interprets the material world as *somehow* dependent on Mind, without consisting of the contents of actual and obtainable representings by finite minds.

§ 5. It would, I think, be generally agreed that to make the primary mode of being of appearances a matter of being represented by a super-subject—God, the Absolute, or the Red King—is to abandon Kant.¹ Nevertheless, without explicitly making this move, the neo-Hegelian interpretation of Kant's phenomenalism, ignored the Cartesian roots of Kant's conception of appearance, and construed appearances as second-class entities, whose second-class-ness was, indeed, interpreted in terms of a non-arbitrary inadequacy of the thoughts of finite minds, but whose relation to what really is was left notoriously obscure. As appearances, material things and empirical minds were put on a par, and conceived to be causally connected in ways explored by empirical psychology. Instead of being the content of actual and obtainable human representings, grounded in unknowable things-in-them-

¹ Which is not to deny that even for Kant, in the last analysis, appearances exist for man because God, in his Providence and Will, conceives of man as representing them.

selves, physical appearance was construed as the ground of the obtainability of human perceptions, and its character as appearance as an unspecified dependence on 'noumenal conditions'.¹

56. When Kemp Smith argues² to some such position from the premise that the actual 'sensations' of finite minds cannot be the 'material' of the world of appearance (since they are only a fragmentary part of it) he is moving from a true premise (that the actual in appearance includes more than the sensory states of empirical selves) and another true, but tacit, premise (that the existence of 'obtainable' sensory states presupposes the existence, in an appropriate sense, of material things) to the false conclusion that the actuality of material things cannot consist in their being actual and obtainable *conceptual* represented—that is to say, actual and obtainable intuitions (in the Kantian sense) rather than actual and obtainable 'sensations'. For the claim that the world of appearance exists 'in' actual and obtainable intuitions is, as we have seen, by no means equivalent to the idea that it consists of actual and obtainable 'sensations' or 'sense contents', let alone actual 'sensations' only.

57. The doctrine of 'double affection' is an essential feature of Kant's thought. Correctly understood, it simply tells us that the transcendently conceived non-spatial, non-temporal action of the non-ego on human receptivity, generating the manifold of sense (which action is required to explain how the *esse* of the experienced world can be *concipi* and yet non-arbitrary and intersubjective) has as its counterpart in the represented world the action of material things on our sense organs and, through them, on the sensory faculties of the empirical self. Thus, of the two 'affections' one has representative being only, while the other has both representative being 'in' transcendental thought *and* also being *simpliciter* or 'in itself'. This can be put by saying that one 'affection' is the appearance of the other, but unless this is supple-

¹ In particular, Kant's valiant attempt to clarify the dependence by means of a 'transcendental' psychology which abstracted from the specific features of human experience as we represent it in the conceptual framework which is natural to us was rejected as involving fictitious mental machinery. Kant's agnosticism is, indeed, to be rejected; but this corrective lies not in dialectical attacks on the concept of an 'unknowable' but in the development of more subtle theories of concept formation.

² *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 276.

mented by a properly Kantian analysis of appearance it acquires the air of intolerable paradox (a 'two-world' theory) which has led an essential part of Kant's mature teachings to be the subject of fruitless and uninformed controversy, and to be regarded as suspect by many of his more sympathetic students.

VIII

58. But why should we not be transcendental realists? Why should we hold that the *esse* of the material world is *concipi*—more accurately, that it exists only 'in' actual and obtainable representations? (I shall follow Kant in calling the latter the thesis of the transcendental ideality of the spatio-temporal world.) Kant offers a number of arguments for this thesis, all of them interesting but of unequal value and relevance to the contemporary scene. Since I am going to defend a closely related thesis, I shall emphasize those facets of his argument which serve this purpose. Thus I shall not deal directly with the *Antinomies*, which, as Kant saw it, give the *coup de grace* to transcendental realism.

59. Let me begin by discussing the transcendental ideality of Space. Kant, of course, was convinced that Space was not the sort of thing which *could* be transcendently real, a conviction which found expression in his reference to it as an 'Unding' (A39; B56) or 'non-thing'. In a certain sense he was absolutely right about this, but mistaken about the conclusions he draws.

60. Let me begin by drawing familiar distinctions. In the first place, between: (a) what I shall call, for reasons which will shortly emerge, 'fine-grained' or 'theoretical' Space. It is an infinite individual, consisting of a three-dimensional continuum of points and containing an infinity of lines, surfaces and regions, the chief characteristic of which, for our purposes, is that they are the willing subject-matter for the mathematical technique of Archimedes, Descartes and the inventors of the differential calculus.

61. (b) Contrasting with this there is what I shall call 'coarse-grained' or empirical Space. It, too, is an infinite individual, but it is an individual the elements of which are *possibilities*—roughly, possible relations of perceptible material things.

62. As an initial elaboration of this distinction, let me point out that there correspond to it two radically different senses of 'material thing', and two radically different senses in which something can be said to occupy a position in Space. Corresponding to 'fine-grained' Space are what might be called 'fine-grained' objects, systems of point-masses. Fine-grained objects are *related to* regions of fine-grained Space. Here, possibility comes in as the possibility of an object occupying this or that region of Space. Fine-grained Space, unlike empirical Space, does not *consist of* possibilities. Its points and regions are *terms* of possible containments.

63. Coarse-grained (or empirical) Space, on the other hand, *consists of* possible relations of coarse-grained material things to one another. Here, the relation of 'occupying a place' is a special case of that interesting kind of relation which is 'realizing a possibility'.

64. The first point I want to make, then, is that Kant would surely be right to claim that both fine-grained Space and fine-grained objects are transcendently ideal. Indeed, the only reason I have refrained from calling them *ideal* Space and *ideal* objects is that to do so would make an important point look like a play on words.

65. Kant, however, confused what I will now call ideal Space and ideal objects with the framework of coarse-grained perceptible objects and the Space which is the system of their possible relations. Thus he mistakenly inferred the transcendental ideality of empirical Space—and, correspondingly, the transcendental ideality of perceptible physical things—from the transcendental ideality of their ideal counterparts

66. Notice, however, that there is a legitimate sense in which, given Kant's theory of the modalities, even empirical Space must be transcendently ideal. For Kant tells us in the metaphysical deduction that:

the modality of judgment is a quite peculiar feature. Its distinguishing character is that it contributes nothing to the content of the judgment . . . but concerns only the value of the copula in relation to thought in general (B100).

Crudely put, Kant's thesis is that the modalities are meta-linguistic, or, less outrageously, meta-conceptual. It might be put by saying that modal attributes are attributes of propositional representables (judgeables) as such, and not of things or events. I shall have something to say about this later on. For the moment I simply note that *if* Kant is right, then empirical Space, consisting as it does of possibilities *qua* possibilities, is *a fortiori* transcendently ideal.

67. *But*, it will immediately be noted, it does not follow from the transcendental ideality of empirical Space as a system of possible relations that particular states of affairs involving spatial relations are transcendently ideal. This is the Achilles' heel of his argument.

68. Why did Kant identify ideal Space with what I am tentatively calling empirical Space? The following considerations seem relevant:

- (1) Both are odd kinds of individual or logical subject. Thus they are clearly not substances, if the abilities to act and be acted on are criteria of substance.
- (2) Kant does not distinguish the transcendently ideality due to ideal-ness from the transcendently ideality due to modality.
- (3) There is a platonic theme reminiscent of the *Phaedo* and *Meno*. After all, Kant's whole conception of experience is a sophisticated development of the platonic notion that we experience the world as spatial by responding to sense impression with ideal geometrical concepts which have not been derived from experience. If one (correctly) rejects 'abstraction from sense impressions' as a theory of geometrical concept formation, then why have *two* non-abstracted systems of spatial concepts? This consideration led to the equating of all geometrical concepts with those of mathematical geometry.¹

69. Kant's sound attack on concept empiricism had the unfortunate consequence that, given certain other commitments, it

¹ Yet, as already indicated, we need at least two systems of geometrical concepts, neither of which can be accounted for in terms of 'abstraction'. (That the acquiring of empirical concepts involves an element of ostensive training can be granted, but this training is only one small facet of the process of acquiring these concepts.)

obscured the difference between two essentially different geometrical frameworks, and two essentially different systems of concepts pertaining to physical things. As a matter of fact, Kant was led to confuse *three* radically different conceptions of 'physical thing', with the result that he failed to notice a further line of argument for the transcendental ideality of perceptible things which really works, and is the one I shall espouse.

70. Yet another confusion, closely related to the above, reinforced Kant's conviction that Space is transcendently ideal in a sense which requires that all spatial states of affairs be transcendently ideal. This is the confusion, explored in the last chapter, between Space as a form of intuition and Space as the form of outer sense, that is, the system of attributes of and relations between sense impressions which accounts for the fact that we intuitively represent now *this*, now *that* spatial configuration of objects. These attributes and relations, as was pointed out in the first chapter, are properly construed as 'spatial' only in an analogical sense; yet their structural similarity to spatial attributes and relations proper makes it tempting to equate them with the latter. This, essentially, is what Kant has done. The *subjectivity* of sense impressions which exist *simpliciter* as states of the self in-itself was confused with the transcendental *ideality* (*esse est concipi*) supposedly established by platonic and modal considerations.

71. The upshot of these remarks is that although Kant was right to claim that the individual or logical subject, Space, is transcendently ideal, he has not shown that particular states of affairs involving *non-ideal* spatial relations must be transcendently ideal. Correspondingly, though he *has* shown that the ideal material things of Newtonian mechanics are transcendently ideal, he has *not* shown that perceptible physical objects standing in perceptible spatial relations are transcendently ideal. If he was right about this, he was right for the wrong reasons.¹

¹ I shall tip my hand by saying that the true ground for the transcendental ideality of the perceptual world lies in the distinction between perceptible physical objects and the objects of theoretical science, a distinction which was blurred by Kant. Thus, his concept of physical appearance runs together not only the idealized counterparts of perceptible things (e.g. systems of point-masses whose velocities and accelerations are amenable to differential equations) but also the object of micro-physics which are as imperceptible as ideal objects, though for radically different reasons.

72. It is also important to note that even if we were to grant him the platonic theme that the Space of perceptual experience is the ideal Space of mechanics, it would still have been open to Kant to say that things-in-themselves, in so far as they affect our sensibility, have, like sense impressions, attributes and relations which are *in their own way* analogous to those of perceptible things, and by virtue of which they elicit sense impressions which are in their *different* way endowed with Space-like characteristics (confused by Kant with the form of outer intuition), and perform the guiding role described above. That Kant implicitly accepted some such view of things-in-themselves is, I think, clear. Yet if the fact had been brought to his attention he would most certainly have claimed that this transcendental use of analogy is *empty*. The abstract concept of such Space-like characteristics could have 'cash value' only for God.

IX

73. Another theme in the Kantian attack on transcendental realism mobilizes an old friend, the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. There seems to be no doubt that Kant, like Descartes, was convinced that material things are properly described in purely spatio-temporal terms; which is not to deny that they have 'secondary qualities' in Locke's sense of the term. He would, of course, insist that our concepts of spatial and temporal characteristics involve the categories or forms of judgment, so that we represent the world in terms of such categorial features as actuality, potentiality, substantial identity, interaction, necessary connection, etc. Or, to put it the other way around, that these characteristics serve as differentia (schemata) for abstract concepts of modes of unity. The point remains, however, that the non-categorial features of represented material things are conceived by Kant to be purely spatial and temporal. Since it is obvious, *pace* Descartes, that nothing which exists 'in itself' can have only spatial or temporal characteristics, the conclusion was reasonably drawn that the world of material things is transcendently ideal.

74. Now Kant is clearly right to claim that nothing 'consisting of mere relations' can be transcendently real. Reality must have qualitative content as well as relational form. There is certainly no reason to suppose—unless one is committed to abstractionism, or

to the view that basic descriptive predicates must be ostensibly 'defined' or 'learned'—that qualitative content is limited to what humans can perceive. Yet reflection on the nature of empirical Space and spatial attributes (if he had not confused them with ideal Space and spatial attributes, and had not taken the subjectivity of colour for granted) would surely have convinced Kant that the objects of perception are as essentially coloured as they are extended; indeed, that their spatial characteristics essentially involve the contrast of colour with colour. An empirical line, for example, is a white streak on a black background, or the edge of a ruler.

75. Thus Kant should have recognized that colour itself, and not something which 'corresponds' to it, is as essential a feature of the objects of outer intuition as is shape. If, therefore, a sound case can be made for the idea that the colours we conceptually represent in perception are transcendently ideal, i.e. exist only as conceptually represented,¹ then it would follow that the world of perceived objects is, after all, in the Kantian sense, 'appearance'.

X

76. Perhaps the most interesting argument for the transcendental ideality of the represented world is what might be called the argument from the transcendental ideality of the categories. It goes somewhat as follows:

Premise I: The categorial forms are forms of what exists in representings, as so existing.

Premise II: What exists in itself does not, as so existing, exist in conceptual representings.

Conclusion I: The categorial forms are not forms of what exists in itself, as so existing.

Premise III: The physical world exists 'in' conceptual representings.

Conclusion II: The physical world as existing 'in' conceptual representings has categorial form.

Conclusion III: The physical world has categorial form.

Conclusion IV: The physical world does not exist in itself.

¹ Notice that this is, of course, compatible with the idea that certain counterpart attributes, conceived by analogy with them, are transcendently real, though, perhaps, only as in some sense states of the perceiver.

I have spelled out the argument in such a way as to make it clear that it is formally fallacious. The invalid step is the move from Conclusion II to Conclusion III. Yet although the argument is fallacious, and, more interestingly, *although Kant never uses it*, it is one of the persistent myths of Kant's scholarship. Most of the puzzles about 'Do the categories apply to things in themselves?' rest on a tacit appeal to the following 'principle':

Nothing which as conceptually represented has categorial form can exist *simpliciter* or in itself.

77. This fallacious and quite un-Kantian principle would require, for example, that since things-in-themselves have categorial form as represented, they cannot exist in themselves! It can scarcely be overemphasized that the difficulty Kant finds with things-in-themselves is that, considerations of morals and religion aside, our conception of them is *empty*—not that it is *incoherent*.

78. I have laid stress on the above argument from the ideality of the categories because *although it is not Kantian*, it is not easy to see why. Furthermore, something like it is at the bottom of many contemporary puzzles. Kant's list of categories is notoriously an *omnium gatherum*. There are many who are inclined to say that at least some of the categories or forms are transcendently ideal. Thus it is said by some that the *modalities* pertain to thought and not to things; that neither *all-ness* nor *some-ness* is 'in the world'; that neither *conjunction* nor *negation* is 'in the world'. There are even those who say that the subject-attribute or subject-relation nexus pertain to thought and not to things. But a fruitful discussion of these topics presupposes an examination of intentionality and truth.